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ABSTRACT: This article reconsiders the relations between Immanuel Kant and Michel Fou-
cault’s essays on the Enlightenment and adds Giorgio Agamben’s essay ‚What is an Appara-
tus?‛ to this constellation.  It explores, specifically, the relations between Foucault’s definition 
of enlightenment and the central notion of Agamben’s philosophy: potentiality.  The relation 
between potentiality and enlightenment is then mobilized in the article in the context of a 
discussion of technology in Kant, Foucault, and Agamben.  What might be the relevance of the 
relation between Foucault’s enlightenment and Agamben’s potentiality for our understanding 
of technological developments today?  The article engages with this question through a dis-
cussion of Foucault’s writings on the care of the self, Agamben’s theory of art, and Bernard 
Stiegler’s work on technology.  It closes with a discussion of an artwork that stages the dra-
matic relation between all of these texts.  
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‚It’s a remarkable piece of apparatus,‛ said the officer to the explorer, and surveyed with a certain 
air of admiration the apparatus which was after all quite familiar to him.  
—Franz Kafka, ‚In the Penal Colony‛ 
 
The question, I think, which arises at the end of the eighteenth century is: What are we in our 
actuality? < ‚What are we today?‛ 
—Michel Foucault, ‚The Political Technology of Individuals‛ 
 
Technics and Enlightenment 
In his recent book Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, Bernard Stiegler discusses a constel-
lation of texts including Immanuel Kant’s essay ‚What is Enlightenment?‛, Michel Foucault’s 
essay ‚What is Enlightenment?‛, and Giorgio Agamben’s essay ‚What is an Apparatus?‛  For 
readers familiar with Stiegler’s early work, in particular the first volume of the six-volume 
project titled Technics and Time,1 it comes as no surprise that Stiegler would be interested in a 
                                                 
1 See Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George 
Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).  
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fellow philosopher’s discussion of apparatuses.2  Stiegler’s general argument in this book is 
that philosophy is yet to think through technics.  Criticizing philosophy’s widespread ressen-
timent against and repression of technics, he offers an overview of some theorists of technical 
evolution (including both lesser known names such as Bertrand Gille, Lucien Febvre, René 
Boirel, and André Leroi-Gourhan, and more famous ones such as Martin Heidegger and 
Gilbert Simondon) in order to develop, in the brilliant second chapter of the book, a discussion 
of technics in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  The position that shines through in these 
chapters as well as in the rest of the book is that contrary to what is generally thought, human 
beings did not invent technics; it is, rather, the other way around: technics invented human 
beings.  The human being came about through a technical change in the constitution of the 
being that preceded it.  Thus, the who emerges out of the what; the question of technics actually 
precedes that of the human.  
Given Stiegler’s project, it makes sense that he would appreciate Agamben’s attempt to 
think through technics.  But that does not mean he is with Agamben.  His reading reveals, 
rather, that in Agamben’s essay, technics is repressed once again in favor of what Stiegler cha-
racterizes as an ‚enigmatic,‛ ‚mysterious,‛ and even ‚mystagogic‛3 praise for the ‚profana-
tion‛ of apparatuses that would ‚bring to light the Ungovernable, which is the beginning and, 
at the same time, the vanishing point of every politics.‛4  Agamben’s essay ends with this 
sentence, and without offering any further explanation of what this ‚Ungovernable‛—which 
is pitched against both apparatuses and government—might be.  In contrast with Agamben’s 
                                                 
2 One should note from the beginning the ambiguity of the term ‚apparatus.‛  In the translations that I am 
working with, ‚apparatus‛ translates both the word for ‚device‛ (‚appareil‛ in French) and what Foucault 
famously calls ‚dispositif‛ (which refers not so much to a device as to a network established between dif-
ferent elements such as ‚discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, admini-
strative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions‛ *Foucault 
quoted in Giorgio Agamben, ‚What is an Apparatus?" in Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus? And Other 
Essays, trans. David Kishik and Stephan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 2]).  The Italian 
word in Agamben’s title that is translated as ‚apparatus‛ is ‚dispositivo‛ (the choice was inspired, ap-
parently, not just by the fact that ‚dispositif‛ in Foucault is usually translated as ‚apparatus,‛ but also by 
Agamben’s note ‚that the torture machine from Kafka’s In the Penal Colony is called an Apparat‛ *Giorgio 
Agamben, What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, trans. David Kishik and Stephan Pedatella (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 55].  The reference to Kafka reveals much about Agamben’s general take on 
technics and technology: from the get-go, the apparatus that Agamben is trying to define is associated with a 
torture machine.  I will come back to this throughout this essay.  In ‚What is an Apparatus?‛, Agamben uses 
the term ‚dispositivo‛ to refer to both ‚appareil‛ and ‚dispositif.‛  Inevitably, my own essay is marked by 
this slippage.  One other obvious lineage of the term ‚apparatus‛ is its use by Louis Althusser in his essay on 
the school as an ‚ideological state apparatus.‛  Althusser’s essay, which pertains to education, is very much 
within the scope of my own project, even though I will not address it explicitly.  Finally, one should note that 
the obvious inter-text for Agamben’s essay on the apparatus is Gilles Deleuze’s essay ‚Qu’est-ce qu’un dis-
positif?‛, which marks a powerful engagement with Foucault’s thought.  I will leave aside here these obvi-
ous references in order to explore instead a much less obvious connection, namely the relation of Agamben’s 
essay to Kant and Foucault’s essays on the Enlightenment.  For an exploration of Foucault and Agamben’s 
uses of the word ‚dispositif,‛ see Jeffrey Bussolini’s contribution to this special issue.  
3 Stiegler, 299. 
4 Agamben, ‚Apparatus, ‛ 24. 
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facile opposition in the essay of ‚two great classes: living beings <and apparatuses,‛5 Stiegler 
insists on technics and human beings’ shared becoming: on the shared processes of indivi-
duation through which they both become.  As Stiegler’s recent work makes clear, this does not 
mean that he blindly embraces technics as humanity’s redeemer.  Indeed, if Stiegler’s early 
work insists on undoing the ressentiment against and the repression of technics in thought, his 
more recent work pairs this insistence on technics with a reflection on the Enlightenment’s 
emancipatory dimension, specifically its relation to education.  
Like some of Stiegler’s other recent works—most explicitly, the volume titled La télé-
cratie contre la démocratie6—Taking Care of Youth and the Generations discusses the ways in which 
technics, and in particular modern technological apparatuses such as the television, are in the 
process of destroying the contemporary youth’s capacity to pay attention.  In addition, because 
our present situation is one in which our memory is exteriorized in apparatuses such as tele-
visions, computers, cellular phones, and iPads, human beings become particularly vulnerable 
to the appropriation—the expropriation and manipulation—of their memory, a state that risks 
to short-circuit what Stiegler calls, after Simondon, human beings’ psychic and collective 
individuation.  Once our memory is taken away from us and replaced with what-ever govern-
ments or capital might want to replace it with, our capacity to psychically and collectively 
individuate ourselves is destroyed.  Television is one of the modern technological apparatuses 
contributing to this destruction, which Stiegler characterizes as a destruction of the spirit.  In 
response, Stiegler (as well as the other members of the Ars Industrialis collective) calls for a 
new politics of the spirit, in which television might very well—will have to, even—play a role.7  
But it is up to us to democratize this modern technological apparatus so that it can become the 
support of human beings’ psychic and collective individuation.  
It is here—in other words, precisely where Stiegler demystifies Agamben’s closing call 
for a ‚profanation‛ of apparatuses—that his interest in the emancipatory dimension of the En-
lightenment comes in.  Whereas Agamben’s negative view on apparatuses is traced back in 
Taking Care of Youth and the Generations to Foucault’s insistence, in his reading of Kant, on the 
second motto of the Enlightenment that Kant distinguishes—‚Argue as much as you will, but 
obey!‛*emphasis mine+—Stiegler for his part proposes a return to Kant’s first motto: ‚Dare to 
know!‛  What might this educational imperative still mean in the era of ‚telecracy‛?  That 
Stiegler takes this question seriously may be clear from one of Ars Industrialis’ most recent 
projects: the creation of a school of philosophy.8  This essay will engage, first of all, with the 
triangulation of Agamben, Kant, and Foucault—in other words, with the connection between 
the technical and emancipatory dimensions of the Enlightenment—that I uncovered in 
Stiegler’s work through a consideration of the close relations between Foucault and Agam-
ben’s engagement with technics and the Enlightenment.  After an analysis of the tension be-
                                                 
5 Ibid., 14. 
6 See Bernard Stiegler, La télécratie contre la démocratie: Lettre ouverte aux représentants politiques (Paris: Flam-
marion, 2008).  
7 See Bernard Stiegler, Réenchanter le monde: La valeur esprit contre le populisme industriel (Paris: Flammarion, 
2006).  
8 For more information, see : Bernard Stiegler, ‚Ecole de philosophie d’Epineuil le Fleuriel,‛ 
http://pharmakon.fr/wordpress/.  
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tween potentiality and actuality in Agamben and Foucault, the essay will further its con-
clusions through a discussion of a work of art that stages the dramatic relations between the 
essays by Kant, Foucault, and Agamben.  This artwork will be presented as a demystified in-
stantiation of what Agamben in ‚What is an Apparatus?‛ calls the ‚profanation‛ of the 
‚counter-apparatus‛: a practice that is able to break with the dark underside of Enlightenment 
technologies, and restore them to their common use.  
 
Actuality, Potentiality, Contingency 
In 1986, Giorgio Agamben gave a lecture entitled ‚On Potentiality‛ at a conference in Lisbon 
organized by the Collège International de Philosophie.  Agamben begins the lecture by saying that 
‚I could state the subject of my work as an attempt to understand the meaning of the verb 
‘can’ *potere+.  What do I mean when I say: ‘I can, I cannot’?‛9  This statement arguably finds 
its most radical articulation in the essay that closes the edited collection Potentialities in which 
‚On Potentiality‛ was first published, namely Agamben’s essay ‚Bartleby, or On Contingen-
cy.‛  Uncovering the importance of Herman Melville’s enigmatic scrivener, Bartleby, for the 
history of philosophy, Agamben argues that Bartleby—a law-copyist who, on the third day of 
his employment in an office on Wall Street, begins to refuse any and all tasks that are assigned 
to him by repeating the formula ‚I would prefer not to‛— is a figure of ‚a complete or perfect 
potentiality that belongs to the scribe who is in full possession of the art of writing in the 
moment in which he does not write.‛10  In the history of philosophy, this ‚complete or perfect 
potentiality‛—what Agamben calls, specifically, a ‚potentiality not to‛—has become eclipsed 
by another kind of potentiality: one that is always already tipping over into actuality.  
Bartleby, however, calls this eclipse into question.  The scrivener’s enigmatic formula—‚I 
would prefer not to‛—marks the persistence of that other kind of potentiality—the potentia-
lity not to—that Agamben is interested in.  
As the title of Agamben’s Bartleby essay indicates, Bartleby is ultimately associated in 
the essay with contingency.  For his definition of this term, Agamben relies on Duns Scotus, 
who wrote: ‚By contingent< I mean not something that is not necessary or eternal, but some-
thing whose opposite could have happened in the very moment in which it happened.‛11  If 
Bartleby is thus a messianic, savior-like figure, as Gilles Deleuze, for example, has argued, he 
does not come: ‚like Jesus to redeem what was, but to save what was not. < Bartleby comes 
not to bring a new table of the Law but <to fulfill the Torah by destroying it from top to 
bottom.‛12 
This passage should not be misunderstood: what Agamben has in mind is not the 
actual destruction of the Law.  What he is interested in, rather, is what he refers to as ‚another 
use‛ of the Law, its ‚deactivation‛ or ‚inactivity *inoperosità+.‛13  As a figure of the potentia-
                                                 
9 Giorgio Agamben, ‚On Potentiality,‚ in Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. 
and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 177. 
10 Giorgio Agamben, ‚Bartleby, or On Contingency,‛ in Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in 
Philosophy, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 246-247. 
11 Duns Scotus quoted in Agamben, ‚Bartleby, or On Contingency,‛ 262. 
12 Agamben, ‚Bartleby, or On Contingency,‛ 270. 
13 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 64. 
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lity not to and more specifically of contingency, Bartleby opens up the possibility of this 
deactivation or inactivity because he perpetually situates the Law at a poetic distance from 
itself, in the region of its own saying.  In other words: in that space where the Law could 
always also have been otherwise.  
The central importance of the notion of potentiality for Agamben’s work has already 
been demonstrated.14  For the purposes of this essay, I propose to reread Foucault’s answer to 
the question ‚What is Enlightenment?‛—and specifically, his relation to Kant on this count—
through the lens of the tension between potentiality and actuality that lies at the heart of 
Agamben’s project.  Much has already been said about the relation of Agamben’s analysis of 
the contemporary political situation to Foucault’s work on governmentality and biopolitics. 
But what about the solutions that Agamben proposes in response to this analysis?  What might 
be the relation of this particular dimension of Agamben’s work to Foucault?  Although I will 
focus on Foucault’s ‚What is Enlightenment?‛, my general suggestion is that in order to an-
swer this question, one must explore the relation of Foucault’s late work on ‚the care of the 
self‛15 to Agamben’s writings.  
 
“The Undefined Work of Freedom”  
From 1978 until his death in 1984, Foucault repeatedly referred back to Kant’s essay ‚What is 
Enlightenment?‛  Kant’s essay famously begins with the definition of Enlightenment as 
‚man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage,‛16 and follows up with a definition of ‚tute-
lage‛: ‚Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from 
another.‛17  ‚Have the courage to use your own reason!‛18 is thus the first motto of the Enligh-
tenment.  Kant insists on human beings’ potential to actively make use of their own reason; 
Enlightenment is defined as human beings’ release from the incapacity to do so.  At the same 
time, however, the term Enlightenment refers to a historical period, a present to which human 
beings are passively exposed.  It refers, in other words, not only to an enlightened act but also 
to an enlightened age.  Kant addresses this double-sidedness—human beings’ active and pas-
sive relation to the Enlightenment—towards the end of his essay, when he raises the question: 
‚Do we now live in an enlightened age?‛19  His answer is, unambiguously, ‚No.‛  ‚*B+ut we 
do live in an age of enlightenment,‛20 he continues.  With this shift from ‚an enlightened age‛ to 
‚an age of enlightenment,‛ Kant manages to combine the active and passive aspects of the 
Enlightenment: he evokes a historical period that is produced through human beings’ actions.  
Thus, it is not so much the age that is enlightened, and that as such guarantees one’s En-
                                                 
14 See Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2009).  
15 See Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3., trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage, 1988).  
16 Immanuel Kant, ‚What is Enlightenment?,‛ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed.), The Politics of Truth, trans. Lysa 
Hochroth and Catherine Porter (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007),  29. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 35. 
20 Ibid. 
De Boever: The Allegory of the Cage 
12 
 
lightenment, but one’s Enlightenment that produces the age.  The final responsibility remains 
ours.  
Although Foucault’s essay ‚What is Enlightenment?‛ is no doubt the best known of his 
many engagements with Kant’s text, Sylvère Lotringer has recently collected a number of the 
others in a volume titled The Politics of Truth.  Since then, Foucault’s 1983 lectures on Kant’s 
text have also been published, in both French and English.  From these different publications, 
it appears that for Foucault, the question of the Enlightenment was one that could not be 
settled.  Its answer never quite actualizes in his lectures and his writings.  Instead, it is per-
petually deferred, like a potentiality that is reactivated in each instance in which it is addres-
sed.  It is not difficult to see how this feature of Foucault’s engagement with the Enlighten-
ment—specifically, the tension between the actual and the potential that characterizes it—is in 
fact a central component of his answer to the question of the Enlightenment.  
Indeed, the tension between the potential and the actual around which Agamben’s 
entire oeuvre revolves is equally central to ‚What is Enlightenment?‛  Towards the end of the 
essay, Foucault summarizes the two arguments that he has been trying to make.  On the one 
hand, he has tried to: 
 
emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation—one that simultane-
ously problematizes man’s relation to the present, man’s historical mode of being, and the 
constitution of the self as an autonomous subject—is rooted in the Enlightenment.21  
 
On the other hand, he has tried to emphasize that what connects ‚us‛ (Foucault and his 
audience, his readers) to the: 
  
Enlightenment is not a faithfulness to doctrinal elements but rather the permanent reactiva-
tion of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent 
critique of our historical era.22 
 
If the first argument could be rephrased as an argument about the human being’s simultane-
ously ‚passive‛ relation to history and its constitution as an autonomous subject, the second 
pushes the latter aspect of that argument into an investigation of a more ‚active‛ ‚attitude.‛23  
Tying this attitude back to the first part of the first argument, it is described earlier on in the 
essay as: 
 
a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; a 
way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same 
time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.  A bit, no doubt, like what 
the Greeks called an ethos.24 
 
                                                 
21 Michel Foucault, ‚What is Enlightenment?‛ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed.), The Politics of Truth, trans. Lysa 
Hochroth and Catherine Porter (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), 109.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 105. 
24 Ibid. 
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In the closing paragraphs of the essay, Foucault also refers to this attitude as a ‚philosophical 
life.‛25  What connects ‚us‛ to the Enlightenment is the permanent reactivation of this life.  
But how is one to understand this ‚reactivation‛ exactly, given the obvious tension 
between the active and the passive, and specifically the actual and the potential, that haunts 
Foucault’s essay?  What is certain is that Foucault pitches his understanding of this ‚reactiva-
tion‛ against Kant.  One might suspect that he is attempting to ‚enlighten‛ Kant here about 
something that he considers Kant’s essay to be missing (or perhaps better, that he considers 
Kant to be missing—for Kant’s text puts one on the track of it, even though Kant himself might 
be missing it).  Foucault reveals that he wants to transform Kant’s enlightened interest in the 
limits of reason into an investigation of transgression.  He is interested in how one can ‚trans-
form the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that 
takes the form of a possible transgression.‛26  Foucault points out that such a critique would be 
both archeological in the sense that it will seek ‚to treat the instances of discourse that 
articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events‛ as well as genealogical in 
the sense that: ‚it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the 
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.‛27 
If the notion of ‚contingency‛ in this passage appears to be tied to what Foucault 
elsewhere in the essay calls the present, one’s historical mode of being, Foucault appears to 
want to push it here toward Duns Scotus’ understanding of it as ‚something whose opposite 
could have happened in the very moment in which it happened.‛  Such would be an en-
lightened critique of contingency, the transformation of contingency into the possibility of 
transgression. Foucault calls such a practice the ‚undefined work of freedom.‛28  
From the closing paragraphs of Foucault’s essay, one gathers that it is not entirely 
certain that such a transformation entails keeping one’s faith in the Enlightenment.  Rather, to 
‚enlighten‛ the Enlightenment, to push it towards the ‚potentiality not to‛ that is central to 
Agamben’s intellectual project, means to question any actualization of the Enlightenment 
itself, so as to return it instead to the question that both Kant and Foucault choose as their title. 
Any enlightened conception of the Enlightenment would thus refrain from presenting the 
Enlightenment as an answer; instead, the Enlightenment is crucially a question, is defined as a 
‚potentiality not to‛ that permanently resists actualization.  Thus, Enlightenment doctrine—
the Law—is pushed back into the poetic regions of its own saying, into those liminal spaces 
that Agamben is so interested in, where the Enlightenment is always also otherwise.  
 
Once More, Philologically 
This is why Foucault, in one of his contributions to a book entitled Technologies of the Self, 
asserts that ‚*t]he question, I think, which arises at the end of the eighteenth century is: What 
are we in our actuality? < ‘What are we today?’‛29  This passage does not only reveal—more 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 170. 
26 Ibid., 113. 
27 Ibid., 114.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gut-
man, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 145. 
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so than some of the other translations of Foucault’s work on the Enlightenment—Foucault’s 
explicit interest in actuality.  The shift that one finds from the first question to the second—i.e. 
the shift from ‚actuality‛ to ‚today‛—also marks one of the main problems of translation in 
Foucault’s essay on the Enlightenment, as well as in his lectures on Kant’s essay.  The problem 
lies in Foucault’s use of the term ‚les actualités,‛ usually translated as ‚the present.‛  From the 
opening paragraphs of Foucault’s essay, it is obvious that ‚the present,‛ ‚today,‛ is a major 
concern in his engagement with the Enlightenment.  However, to translate ‚les actualités‛ 
merely as ‚the present‛ means to lose the notion of actuality that is inscribed in the original 
French term, ‚les actualités.‛  In French, ‚the present‛ is of the order of the actual: to inquire 
into the present means to inquire into the actual.  Foucault’s main critique of such a concep-
tualization of the present will be to insist on the potential, specifically on the ‚potentiality not 
to.‛  From this perspective, the present becomes contingent (in Scotus’ and Agamben’s sense 
of the word): it could also always have been otherwise.  If we are still living in the present of 
the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment is thus not so much ‚les actualités‛ but, rather, poten-
tiality—specifically, the ‚potentiality not to.‛30  
Foucault’s obsession with the tension between actuality and potentiality, and speci-
fically with the word actual, is particularly obvious in the French original of his lectures on 
Kant’s essay. Enlightenment is ‚la question du présent,‛ he states, ‚c’est la question de l’ac-
tualité.‛31  Note how the present, ‚le présent,‛ is immediately translated here into the actual, 
‚l’actualité.‛  ‚Qu’est-ce qui, dans le présent, fait sens actuellement pour une réflexion philo-
sophique?‛32  Here Foucault establishes once again the connection between the present and the 
actual, this time through his use of the adverb ‚actuellement‛: ‚What is it that, in the present, 
makes sense today *actuellement+ for philosophical reflection?‛  At a crucial point in the first 
lecture, Foucault insists very forcefully on the centrality of actuality for his reflection on the 
Enlightenment by asking: ‚Quelle est mon actualité? < Quel est le sens de cette actualité?  Et 
qu’est-ce que fait le fait que je parle de cette actualité?‛33  ‚What is my present? < What is the 
meaning of this present?  And what causes me to speak of this present?‛  In each of these 
cases, ‚actualité‛ could just as well have been translated by ‚actuality.‛  Whereas the reader of 
the English translation risks encountering a text that is obsessed with the present—an en-
counter that would not entirely be missed, since the present is obviously a central concern in 
Foucault’s text—the reader of the French original encounters in addition a text that is obsessed 
with actuality.34  
At the end of his first lecture on Kant, Foucault evokes specifically the tension between 
actuality and potentiality that informs Agamben’s work. He asks: ‚Quel est le champ actuel 
                                                 
30 John Rajchman comes very close to stating this in his introduction to The Politics of Truth: John Rajchman, 
‚Enlightenment Today‛ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed.), The Politics of Truth, trans. Lysa Hochroth and Catherine 
Porter (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), 9-27. See in particular page 15.   
31 Michel Foucault, Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres: Cours au Collège de France 1982-1983, ed. François 
Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, and Frédéric Gros (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 13. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 15. 
34 All translations from Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres in both this paragraph and the following are mine.  
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des expériences possibles?‛35  ‚What is the present *actuel+ field of possible experiences?‛  En-
lightenment, for Foucault, will have to do with separating out from the actuality of what one is 
‚the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.‛  Enlightened 
freedom thus comes about not as a state that would be achieved once and for all but as a 
process, a kind of ‚work‛: it is a ‚patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty.‛36  
Enlightenment is thus inscribed at the very end of Foucault’s essay in the aesthetico-ethical 
practices of self-cultivation that Foucault at this point in his career is analyzing in his work on 
sexuality.  It is theorized here as an ‚art of existence,‛37 a form of what Foucault in the second 
volume of The History of Sexuality calls the ‚technè tou biou‛38 or ‚care of the self.‛  In ‚What is 
Enlightenment?‛ Foucault theorizes Enlightenment as an ‚art of living,‛39 a practice which be-
comes part of the practices of the ‚cura sui‛40 that he reveals to be a central concern in classical 
philosophy.  In the Enlightenment essay, the ‚labor‛41 implied by the ‚care of the self‛ is tur-
ned into the ‚undefined work of freedom.‛  Enlightenment is a social practice through which 
one attends to oneself and thus, ultimately, to others.42  
What thus emerges in my discussion of Foucault’s understanding of Enlightenment is a 
theory of Enlightenment as a biotechnic, a technique of taking care of one’s life.  Enlighten-
ment is theorized by Foucault as a technique of care-taking.  In the next section of this essay, I 
discuss further the place of technics and specifically of technology in both Kant’s and Fou-
cault’s essays, in order to then turn towards the third text in the constellation that is under 
discussion here: Agamben’s ‚What is an Apparatus?‛  Indeed, while Agamben cites the first 
volume of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, specifically its closing section on biopower, as 
one of his major influences in the introduction to his study of sovereign power titled Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Foucault’s shift in the third volume of The History of 
Sexuality from biopolitics to biotechnics remains largely unthought in his writings.  Instead, 
whenever Agamben is forced to address it, a careful thought of technics, technology, and the 
care of the self is pushed aside in favor of what Stiegler has characterized as a mystical politics 
of the Ungovernable, marked for example in Agamben’s book on Saint Paul, by his embrace of 
messianism. 
 
                                                 
35 Foucault, Gouvernement, 22. 
36 Foucault, ‚Enlightenment,‛ 119. 
37 Foucault, Technologies, 43. 
38 Foucault, Care, 43. 
39 Ibid., 45. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 50. 
42 Ibid., 53.  One of the many valuable points made by Jeffrey Nealon in his recent Foucault Beyond Foucault—
a book that reexamines Foucault’s importance today, and turns to Foucault’s Enlightenment essay through-
out its argument—is that this enlightened care of the self should not be understood as theory’s version of 
Nike’s ‚Just Do It‛ motto.  Indeed, as my discussion of the tension between potentiality and actuality in 
Foucault shows, the ‚doing‛ of ‚care‛ and the ‚labor‛ or ‚work‛ it implies might ultimately have more to 
do with an ‚undoing‛ or ‚unworking‛—with the ‚worklessness‛ and ‚inoperativity‛ evoked by Agamben 
—than with Nike’s sweatshop-tainted imperative.  See Jeffrey Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), especially the first chapter. 
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The Question of Technology 
Early on in his description of the Enlightenment, Kant evokes the curious image of domes-
ticated animals made dumb by their guardians who ‚have made sure that these placid 
creatures will not dare take a single step without the harness of the cart to which they are 
tethered.‛43  In his second lecture on Kant’s essay, Foucault comments on Kant’s use of the 
word ‚Gängelwagen‛ for what is translated in the English version of the essay as ‚cart.‛44  
Foucault points out that the German word refers to a kind of walking rack that was used in the 
eighteenth century to both help infants to walk and to prevent them from walking wherever 
they liked.  The cart is thus a technical object that both enables freedom and enforces a degree 
of obedience.  One can understand why Foucault would have been interested in this word: he 
considers it to be emblematic of Kant’s answer to the question of the Enlightenment.  The cart 
evokes, specifically, the second motto that Kant gives in response: ‚Argue, but obey!‛  The cu-
rious fact, however, is that Kant, in his text, rejects the cart as what prevents people from using 
their own reason.  To have the courage to use your own reason means precisely to learn to 
walk without the help of the cart.  Foucault’s analysis will show, however, that Kant’s en-
lightened subject nevertheless remains tied to the cart.  
Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment thus appears to coincide with a rejection of a 
technical object.  To become enlightened means to become independent from technical supple-
ments.  It means for the human being to ‚finally learn to walk alone.‛45  Even though the En-
lightenment is usually associated with the exponential increase of technological developments, 
Kant’s definition of Enlightenment appears to install a separation between human beings and 
technology.  It is a definition of Enlightenment that is suspicious of the relation of techno-
logical development to freedom.46  This suspicion is echoed in Foucault’s essay, which partly 
aims to show that ‚the relations between the growth of capabilities and the growth of autono-
my are not as simple as the eighteenth century may have believed‛: 
 
 And we have been able to see [Foucault writes] what forms of power relation were 
conveyed by various technologies (whether we are speaking of productions with 
economic aims, or institutions whose goal is social regulation, or of techniques of 
communication): disciplines, both collective and individual, procedures of norma-
lization exercised in the name of the power of the state, demands of society or of 
population zones, are examples. What is at stake then, is this: How can the growth 
of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?47 
 
In this passage, Enlightenment technology is closely associated with power.  It operates in the 
service of collective and individual discipline.  In this sense, it prevents the autonomy (that the 
Enlightenment so prides itself on) from coming about.  
                                                 
43 Kant, 29-30. 
44 Foucault, Gouvernement, 28. 
45 Kant, 30. 
46 Many have commented on Kant’s suspicion of technology.  See, for example: R.L. Rutsky, ‚The Spirit of 
Utopia and the Birth of the Cinematic Machine,‛ in R.L. Rutsky, High Technè: Art and Technology from the 
Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 23-47.  
47 Foucault, "Enlightenment,‛ 116. 
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One should note, however, that the key question to which this insight leads is not a 
rejection of technology.  Foucault asks, rather, how the growth of Enlightenment technologies 
could be disconnected from the intensification of power relations.  One could read this as a 
version of the genealogical question, formulated elsewhere in the essay, about ‚the possibility 
of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think‛: how could Enlightenment 
technologies be used otherwise?  
In this, Foucault’s engagement with the particular problem of Enlightenment techno-
logies appears to differ fundamentally from that of one of his students, Giorgio Agamben.  
Although they are not the obvious inter-texts for Agamben’s essay, ‚What is an Apparatus?‛ 
clearly refers to both Kant and Foucault’s essays on the Enlightenment.  Foucault is, as always, 
one of the main interlocutors in Agamben’s text; but Agamben focuses on the dark side of 
Foucault’s analyses rather than on his late work on the aesthetico-ethical techniques of the self.  
When Agamben speaks towards the very end of his essay of how ‚the harmless citizen of 
postindustrial democracies< readily does everything that he is asked to, inasmuch as he 
leaves his everyday gestures and his health, his amusements and his occupations, his diet and 
his desires, to be commanded and controlled in the smallest detail by apparatuses,‛48 it is not 
only Foucault and his discussion of governmentality and biopolitics that resonates here.  One 
is also reminded of the second paragraph of Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment, where Kant 
criticizes human beings who do not have the courage ‚to be of age‛: ‚If I have a book which 
understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet, 
and so forth, I need not trouble myself.  I need not think, if I can only pay—others will readily 
undertake the irksome work for me.‛49  The echoes of Kant in Agamben’s essay allow one to 
understand that Agamben is also engaging with the Enlightenment in ‚What is an Appara-
tus?‛  Like Kant, he is calling for an emancipation; even more explicitly than in Kant, the 
emancipation that Agamben has in mind is an emancipation from apparatuses—from the 
apparatuses that command and control ‚in the smallest detail‛ the lives of human beings.  
In this loaded context, Agamben proposes a distinction between two major classes: 
‚living beings‛ on the one hand, and ‚apparatuses‛ on the other.  In addition, he distinguishes 
a third class, which is produced in the power struggle between living beings and apparatuses: 
‚subjects.‛50  Agamben’s vision of life’s relation to technology is one of a perpetual war be-
tween living beings and apparatuses.  Foucault’s question: ‚how can the growth of capabilities 
be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?‛ thus appears to become tainted 
in Agamben by the specter of blind rejection.51  
                                                 
48 Giorgio Agamben, ‚What is an Apparatus?‛ in What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, trans. by David 
Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 22-23. 
49 Kant, 29. 
50 Agamben, ‚Apparatus,‛ 14. 
51 Of course, one might argue that Agamben’s distinction is ultimately merely analytical, and does not reflect 
the nuances of his thought on technology.  As Anne Sauvagnargues remarked in response to a conference 
presentation I gave on Agamben and Simondon, Agamben’s ultimate interest might simply be modes of 
subjectivation.  Although this point is well taken, it does not adduce the tone of Agamben’s essay, which is 
one of struggle and conflict between human beings and machines.  For my text on Agamben and Simondon, 
see Arne De Boever, ‚Agamben et Simondon: Ontologie, technologie, et politique,‛ trans. Jean-Hugues Bar-
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However, although Agamben explicitly says that he is not interested in ‚another use‛ 
of technology,52 ‚blind rejection‛ does not appear to describe his position correctly either.  
Somewhat enigmatically, the closing pages of the essay reveal him to be calling for a ‚pro-
fanation‛ of apparatuses, meaning a restoration of apparatuses to their ‚common use.‛53  In 
this sense, profanation would function as a ‚counter-apparatus‛54; a technique or technology 
against technologies that would halt the destructive progression of modern Enlightenment 
technologies.  It would end the ‚telecracy‛ that Stiegler also warns against.  Whereas appara-
tuses have become part and parcel of what Agamben calls the theological economy of 
government—a division of power that intends to saturate the entire field of life with the 
violence of the law—our task is to liberate apparatuses from this arrangement and restore 
them to their common use.  As to what this might mean, exactly, with respect to an apparatus 
such as the cell phone, which Agamben comes close to rejecting in his essay, remains vague.  
And it precisely on this account that Stiegler attempts to push Agamben further.  But what are 
the realms included in Agamben’s work in which the counter-apparatus of profanation might 
be witnessed in action?  What might be the link that is included (and lies occluded) in Agam-
ben’s work between the profanation that Agamben is calling for and what Foucault in his late 
work calls the ‚art of the self‛? 
This question might ultimately not be all that hard to answer.  One realm of technical 
production in which such profanation becomes possible is art.  In the opening chapter of his 
first book titled The Man Without Content, Agamben calls for a notion of the aesthetic that 
would do justice to the human being’s technical capacities, specifically the human being’s 
uncanny ‚ability to pro-duce, to bring a thing from nonbeing into being.‛55  Such an under-
standing of the aesthetic would reconsider art from the position of the creator (rather than 
from the position of the spectator from where Kant considers it in his Critique of Judgment) and 
return it to its Ancient, political vocation: to pose a danger to the polis, to the city-state.  In its 
technical dimension, art is something profoundly dangerous.  The tragedy of our time is that 
art has lost this dimension, and has turned into something that is ‚merely interesting‛; it is 
‚*o+nly because art has left the sphere of interest to become merely interesting‛ that ‚we 
welcome it so warmly.‛56  Aware of the danger that art poses to the city, Plato instead bans it 
from his ideal republic. A terrifying judgment, at first sight; but at least Plato took art serious-
ly.  Agamben theorizes art in the opening chapter of his book as ‚the most uncanny thing,‛ as 
a capacity that inspires ‚divine terror‛ because it reveals human beings’ essential capacities for 
production, for ‚divine‛ creation and destruction.57 
In his work on the care of the self, Foucault as well appears to maintain a positive 
connection between art (‚technè‛) and life (‚bios‛) as a way for the subject to become the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
thélémy, Cahiers Simondon, no. 2 (2010), 117-128.  
52 Ibid., 15. 
53 Ibid., 17. 
54 Ibid., 19. 
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author of her or his own life, to cultivate her or his own existence.  It is here that the con-
nection between biological and psychic life and technics and technology can begin to move 
from the horrific nightmare of biopolitics and biotechnology (instantiated in the imagination 
of film directors such as David Cronenberg, for example), to the more positive promise of 
biopower and biotechnics.  The latter can be found not just in Foucault’s work on the care of 
the self but also in the visionary volume titled Incorporations edited by Jonathan Crary and 
Sanford Kwinter, in more recent publications such as William Connolly or Catherine 
Malabou’s books on the brain (titled Neuropolitics and What Should We Do With Our Brain?), or 
even in cinematic explorations of the figure of the samurai in films by Akira Kurosawa (Seven 
Samurai), Jim Jarmusch (Ghost Dog), or Quentin Tarantino (Kill Bill).58  Today, and in line with 
both Foucault and Agamben’s suggestions, it is the new interest in bioart that appears to be 
one of the most promising realms for such a new discussion of techniques of life.  It would 
seem appropriate, then, to explore in the final section of this essay, the ways in which a work 
of art contributes to the theoretical debates with which I have engaged, specifically with the 
dramatic relations between Kant, Foucault, and Agamben that this essay has uncovered.  
 
The Allegory of the Cage 
During the Fall 2009 semester, a few weeks before I was set to teach a cluster of texts including 
Kant and Foucault’s essays on the Enlightenment, as well as Agamben’s essay ‚What is an 
Apparatus?‛, I came across a minimalist art installation at the California Institute of the Arts 
that seemed to capture not just something about each of these three texts, but also about their 
dramatic relation.59  The installation consisted of a rectangular cage that was open in the back 
but set up against a wall.  The front of the cage and the right side of the cage were closed with 
chicken wire.  Although the cage was locked in its top right corner, the wire in the bottom left 
corner was peeled up, suggesting the possibility of a way in or out.  Inside the cage, a pink 
neon light stood slanted against the left wall of the cage.  Against the right side, there was a 
small mirror reflecting (depending on the viewer’s position) either the pink light on the op-
posite side of the cage, or the chicken wire and the space outside the cage.  Resting on top of 
the cage was a white neon light.  It turned out that this was a work by Photography and Media 
student Lee Perillo, who was at that time taking my BFA upper-level philosophy course titled 
‚What is Biopolitics?‛  Perillo’s work was part of a group show on ‚queer art.‛  
Perhaps because I had the Enlightenment on my mind, this work made instant sense to 
me within the constellation of essays about the Enlightenment that I have been discussing.  
Couldn’t one think of the pink light inside the cage as Kant?  Kant’s answer to the question 
‚What is Enlightenment?‛ revolves around two mottos.  The first is ‚Sapere aude!‛ ‚Have the 
courage to use your own reason!‛60  For Kant, to become enlightened means to come ‚of age‛: 
it means to move from being a minor, who can only walk with the help of a frame, to being a 
                                                 
58 On this point, see George Collins’ contribution on the figure of the samurai to the study group on the 
‚Techniques de soi‛ organized by Ars Industrialis, available at http://www.arsindustrialis.org/petite-
annonce-pour-un-sous-groupe-de-travail-sur-les-cultures-de-soi.  
59 A photograph of the installation is shown on the cover of this issue of Foucault Studies. 
60 Kant, 29. 
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major, to walking ‚alone.‛61  Kant’s second motto, however, is: ‚Argue as much as you will, 
and about what you will, but obey!‛62  It is this second motto—argue, but obey—that seemed to 
justify Kant’s position inside the cage.  
Although Kant’s text is clearly about a way out—‚Enlightenment is man’s release from 
his self-incurred tutelage‛63—that way out comes with the necessary limitation of obedience 
(the cage).  The mirror standing against the right wall of the cage reflects this truth back to 
Kant.  It is for this reason that Foucault, at the beginning of his text about Kant’s essay, can (no 
doubt partly as a joke) refer to Kant’s essay as ‚a minor text, perhaps‛64: from where Foucault 
is standing, it appears that Kant’s enlightenment is not entirely enlightened yet. Kant’s own 
text had not fully completed the process of ‚becoming major.‛  Foucault’s reference to Kant’s 
text as a ‚minor‛ text can be read as a joke, given the emphasis that Kant puts on becoming 
major, ‚of age.‛  Enlightenment is, for Kant, about growing up, about turning from a minor 
into someone who can walk and think for her- or himself. And so Foucault sets out to ‚finish‛ 
this task—a completion that in Foucault’s essay never quite takes place, as I have already 
discussed above.  In Perillo’s work, the white light could thus be said to represent Foucault, or 
Foucault’s understanding of the Enlightenment, which has worked its way out of the cage.  
Nevertheless, even Foucault’s Enlightenment is not entirely freed of the cage.  The 
white neon light rests on top of the cage; it is supported by it.  This relation between the white 
light and the cage appears to draw into question the ‚completion‛ that Foucault’s text at first 
sight might appear to provide.  And indeed, the point of Foucault’s essay appears to be that 
the process of Enlightenment might never be completed.  It involves, rather, a ‚patient labor 
giving form to our impatience for liberty.‛65  In other words, Enlightenment is not a perma-
nent state that can be achieved, but the very movement from inside the cage (the pink light) to 
outside the cage (the white light) that Perillo’s work captures.  It involves, in other words, a 
patient work upon oneself—a turning back upon oneself and one’s limitations from a per-
spective that is gained through one’s labor for freedom.  Might this not be why the titles of 
both Kant and Foucault’s essays take the form of a question?  Might this not explain why 
Foucault’s essay exists in many different versions, all of them exploring the same question 
from slightly different angles, with slightly different concerns?66  As the title of my essay sug-
gests, this understanding of Enlightenment also recalls Plato’s dialectic: the point of Plato’s 
allegory of the cave is not simply to move outside of the cave and into the realm of the ideas, 
where one is blinded by the sun; it is, rather, to return back into the cave after one has grasped 
the ideas, and to try to explain them to those who can see only shadows.67  There is thus an 
emphatically pedagogical dimension to Plato’s allegory, as Stiegler in his reading of the Kant-
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63 Kant, 29. 
64 Foucault, ‛Enlightenment,‛ 97. 
65 Ibid., 119. 
66 See Foucault, The Politics of Truth.  
67 See Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 532a-533a.  
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Foucault-Agamben constellation has suggested.68  Perillo is staging a veritable allegory of the 
cage here.  
Perillo’s joke, of course, is that Kant is represented by the pink, ‚queer‛ (slanted) light 
and Foucault by the white, ‚straight‛ light. Given that the work was part of a ‚queer art‛ 
group show, the play with colors is no doubt significant.  By putting the pink light inside the 
cage, the artist might want to evoke the ways in which queer identity is, as queer identity, still 
very much caught up in the normativizing constrictions that a more radical, a more en-
lightened, queerness might instead aspire to subvert.  To be identifiably pink might ultimately 
be no more queer than to be identifiably straight.  A radical politics of queerness would, per-
haps, undermine these identitarian constructions and draw out, instead, a more universal, 
more enlightened, humanity.69  At the same time, however, the artist’s choice of the color 
white to represent this enlightened humanity that has worked its way out of the cage draws 
into question the use of the color ‚white‛ to represent this ideal.  To what extent is humanity 
still caught up in the moralizing color scheme—darkness is bad, sunlight is good—within 
which Plato’s allegory of the cave already operated?  It might be, and here is where the work 
again captures the spirit of Foucault’s ‚What is Enlightenment?‛, that the white light—which 
is still supported by the cage—might need to do some further work on itself. It might be that 
its whiteness is not quite as ideal as one might have assumed.  
Finally, and now we come to Agamben’s essay, there is the technical dimension of Pe-
rillo’s work.  Perillo’s minimalist installation makes no attempt to hide the technologies on 
which it depends: the work needs to be set up near a power outlet, and it leaves clearly visible 
the electric cables connecting the lights to the outlets.  Whatever thought the work enables, 
thus explicitly depends on the support of technology.  Technology is not Perillo’s enemy.  In-
stead, the artist mobilizes it within the context of a radical Enlightenment project—a project 
that goes beyond Kant and stages the dramatic relation of Kant to Foucault.   
Perhaps Perillo’s work thus provides us with an example of what Agamben calls the 
profanation of the counter-apparatus.  Its bricolage-like assembly of the frame of the cage, the 
chicken wire, the neon lights, and the lock on the cage, recalls Agamben’s memorable de-
scription, in a chapter from State of Exception, of a day when humanity ‚will play with law just 
as children play with disused objects: not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to 
free them from it for good.‛70  This practice is described by Agamben not as a destruction but 
as a ‚deactivation‛ or rendering ‚inoperative.‛71  It is perhaps in this ‚inoperativity,‛ this 
‚worklessness,‛ that the link between the profanation of the counter-apparatus and Fou-
cault’s understanding of Enlightenment—marked by their shared interest in potentiality—
becomes most clear.  For as I remarked in a footnote earlier on, one should not confuse Fou-
cault’s theorization of Enlightenment as a technique of attending to oneself with the ‚Just Do 
It‛ imperative that governs contemporary culture.  Instead, both Foucault’s theorization of 
                                                 
68 See Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
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69 See Michael Warner, The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (Cambridge: Harvard 
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Enlightenment and Agamben’s theorization of profanation challenge such blind actualization 
by insisting on a potentiality that precedes any actuality and marks actuality’s capacity of 
being otherwise—what I have called in the second section of this essay, its contingency.  It is 
this powerful truth that a philosophy of technics and technology, of human beings’ uncanny 
capacity to bring something from nonbeing into being, also entails.  
In Perillo’s artwork, the incapacitating technology of the cage thus becomes the capa-
citating—understood here in the sense of potentializing—component of the work of art, enclo-
sing the slanted, pink light representing Kant’s Enlightenment, and supporting the straight, 
white light of Foucault’s Enlightenment.  As a work of profanation, it liberates the cage from 
being an actualizing technology of government, turning it into a dramatic, playful staging of 
Kant, Foucault, and Agamben’s answers to the question ‚What is Enlightenment?‛   
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